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Abstract. Insider threat is becoming comparable to outsider threat in
frequency of security events. This is a very worrying situation, as in-
sider attacks have a high probability of success because insiders have
authorized access and legitimate privileges. As a result, organizations
can suffer financial losses and damage to assets and to reputation. De-
spite their importance, insider threats are still not properly addressed by
organizations. We contribute to reverse this situation by introducing a
framework composed of a method and of supporting awareness deliver-
ables. The method organizes the identification and assessment of insider
threat risks from the perspective of the organization goal(s)/business
mission. This method is supported by three deliverables. First, by attack
strategies structured in four decomposition trees. Second, by a pattern of
insider attack which reduces an insider attack step to six possible scenar-
ios. Third, by a list of defense strategies which helps on the elicitation of
requirements. The output of the method consists of goal-based require-
ments for the defense against insiders. Attack and defense strategies are
collected from the literature and from organizational control principles.
Keywords: Insider threat, control principles, attack strategies, defense strate-
gies, risk assessment
1 Introduction
According to recent surveys [1,2,3] and reports from studies carried out by the
U.S. Secret Services and the CERT1 (e.g [4,5]), insiders are responsible for ma-
jor financial losses, damage to organizational reputation and assets and also for
disruptions. Worse, insider attacks are tending to rise and to be comparable in
frequency to security events originated by outsiders. We consider an insider, as
defined by Bishop [6], as ”a trusted entity that is given the power to violate
one or more rules in a given security policy ... the insider threat occurs when a
trusted entity abuses that power”. The CERT categorizes insider crime in three
1 Center of Internet Security from Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering
Institute - http://www.cert.org/insider_threat/
major groups: fraud, theft of information and IT sabotage. The first one occurs
when someone obtains unjustifiable services or property from the organization.
The second one occurs when someone steals confidential or proprietary informa-
tion from the organization. The third, and last, one occurs when someone harms,
in any sense, the organization or individual(s) within the organization. Among
these groups they found: (i) there is no conclusive evidence that a general profile
of insiders exists, and (ii) in more than half of the cases studied, insiders ex-
ploited vulnerabilities in applications, processes and procedures/policies. Thus,
the insiders problem is particularly different from the outsiders problem because
it does not only involve technical aspects but also organizational and even psy-
chological aspects, such as the ones related to unmet expectations and wish for
revenge. Additionally, the technical aspect is also very distinct because, for in-
siders, it involves abuse of access and subtle violations of control principles while
for outsiders, it involves forcing access and escalation of privileges. Furthermore,
because insiders have authorized access and legitimate permissions to the orga-
nization inner network area, their malicious actions have high probability to be
successful and to end up undetected.
To solve the insider threat problem, many challenges have yet to be overcome.
One challenge is the identification and assessment of risks that insiders represent
to an organization. This awareness of risks allows planning of detection and
prevention countermeasures. Another challenge is the modeling and analysis of
the insider threat in a practical way, as for example step-wise or very detailed
approaches like attack trees [7], misuse cases [8] and defense trees [9] may become
unusable due to the large number of possibilities to be considered. This large
number is caused by, for example, the wide spectrum of insiders’ goals. Even
another challenge is the lack of tool support for organizations in the process of
identification and assessment of insider risks.
The contribution of this paper is a framework that addresses the two first
challenges mentioned above. The framework consists of a method for identifica-
tion and assessment of insider threat risks and elicitation of goal-based require-
ments for defense against those risks, and of three deliverables. The deliverables
are: (i) insider attack strategies structured in four decomposition trees, (ii) a
pattern which provides the big picture of insiders attack and which can be in-
stantiated with the attack strategies, and (iii) defense strategies against insiders
that are useful for the requirements elicitation step. The purpose of these three
deliverables is to increase awareness about the insider problem in general for
a more efficient and effective application of the method in an organizational
context. The deliverables which support the method take the perspective of con-
trol principles, which are exploited by attack strategies and enforced by defense
strategies. This perspective enables to look at the insider problem as a whole and
gather requirements against all insiders categories, i.e. fraud, theft of information
and IT sabotage.
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1.1 Organization of the paper
This paper is organized as follows. We first present the framework for the gather-
ing of requirements for defense against insiders in Section 2. Then, in Section 3,
we provide a taxonomy of control principles useful for the derivation of attack
and defense strategies. Next, we organize insiders attack strategies in four de-
composition trees and propose an insider attack pattern, in Section 4. Defense
strategies matching the attack strategy trees are listed in Section 5. This section
also presents a matrix connecting the three basic ingredients of our framework
(i.e. control principles, attack strategies and defense strategies). In Section 6 the
actual method, which is the core of the framework, is detailed. Section 7 de-
scribes an example application of the framework. In Section 8 the framework is
discussed, in Sections 9 related work is reviewed, and in Section 10 we conclude
and point to future work.
2 A framework for gathering requirements for defense
against insider threat
This section provides a high level overview of the framework we propose in this
paper. The goal of the framework is to help organizations to identify require-
ments for IT infrastructure, organizational structures, and policies, that enable
its defense against insiders.
As shown in Figure 1, control principles are our starting point for reasoning
about insider threats. The motivation for this choice is twofold. First, insiders
exploit vulnerabilities and one alternative they have to achieve that relies on ex-
ploiting control principles. The link between vulnerability and control principles
is observable in definitions of vulnerability such as the one by Stoneburner [10]:
”[vulnerability] is a flaw or weakness in system security procedures, design, im-
plementation or internal controls that could be exercised (accidentally triggered
or intentionally exploited) and result in a security breach or a violation of the
system’s security policy”. Second, control principles provide mechanisms for or-
ganizations to prevent and detect insiders activities. Thus, as represented in the
figure, control principles are, on the one hand, exploited by attack strategies, due
to flaws or weaknesses in processes, applications, infrastructure, etc, and, on the
other hand, enforced by defense strategies to assure a certain level of security.
The framework is composed of a method and of supporting deliverables which
provide awareness about insider threats in terms of attack and defense strategies.
The method guides the organization through the identification and assessment
of risks that insiders represent to its most critical assets and processes, defined
according to the organization goal(s) and business mission. Attack strategies,
as mentioned in the previous paragraph, have been derived from possible ex-
ploitations of control principles and from past insider cases documented in the
literature [11,4,5,12]. From the latter we acknowledge insights about possible
exploitations on applications, infrastructure and organizational structure. De-
fense strategies have also been derived from control principles and from defenses
methods documented in the literature.
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3 Taxonomy of organizational control principles
Cobit [13] defines controls as ”the policies, procedures, practices and organiza-
tional structures designed to provide reasonable assurance that business objec-
tives will be achieved and undesired events will be prevented or detected and cor-
rected.”. Although each organization implements specific controls according to
their goal(s)/business mission and overall security requirements, they are based
on common control principles which apply to any organization. A taxonomy of
control principles related to IT, composed from the literature [14,15,16,17], is
presented next.
1. Separation of Duty (SoD): from [16] ”[SoD aims to ensure that] no em-
ployee or group should be in a position both to perpetrate and to conceal
errors or fraud in the normal course of their duties”. This principle can be
enforced in a static way, by not permitting one person to assume incompat-
ible functions/permissions (i.e. exclusive roles), and in a dynamic way, by
not permitting the activation of exclusive roles in the same session. Dynamic
SoD can come in three flavours: (i) object SoD - same person prohibited to
perform critical operations on a same object, (ii) operation SoD - same per-
son prohibited to perform critical functions in a workflow, and (iii) history
SoD - same person prohibited to perform all his authorizations on the same
object over time. This principle can be difficult to achieve in small organiza-
tions. In this case, other principles [18] like reconciliation, review, audit and
supervision can be used.
2. Dual Control (also called Two-Person Rule or Four-eye Principle): this
principle aims to make sure that sensitive tasks require two individuals,
usually with identical roles and hierarchical position, to perform.
3. Delegation and Revocation: delegation refers to a change in the assign-
ment of authorization from one person to another. Revocation cancels dele-
gation.
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4. Supervision, Review and Audit: supervision [19] aims to make sure that
subordinates execute assigned obligations. Review aims to control the exe-
cution of delegated obligations. Audit aims to allow tracing and analysis of
events collected in audit logs.
5. Accountability and Specification of Competence: from [20] ”[account-
ability] enables activities on a system to be traced to an individual who may
be held responsible for their actions”. Individuals should be accountable for
what they are competent to do [14].
6. Least Privilege and Need-to-know: least privilege aims to ensure that
individuals are only assigned to the minimum set of privileges needed to
perform their duties. Need-to-know is a special case of least privilege used
on military environments. It rely on labels for individuals and objects to
restrict access to information.
7. Non-repudiation: from [21] ”non-repudiation of action ensures that online
actions taken by users, including system administrators and privileged users,
can be attributed to the person that performed them”. This is the meaning of
non-repudiation that is more appropriate to the insiders scenario, neverthe-
less, for the sake of completeness, this principle is usually used in the context
of ensuring that a transaction cannot be denied by the parties involved.
8. Reconciliation: control based on totals, balancing sheets, i.e. on cross-
information checking.
9. Classification of Assets: classification of assets ensures CIA2 via levels of
security depending on the protection required. It is prescribed by security
standards like ISO 17799 [17] as a means to maintain control over assets.
It is important to have in mind that humans are also assets and thus the
classification of users in roles, clearance levels or groups is also instrument
of control.
In the next two sections, Sections 4 and 5, these control principles are taken
into consideration from opposite perspectives. From the insider (i.e. attacker)
perspective, the goal is to violate controls and perform malicious actions without
being noticed. From the organization perspective, the goal is to employ controls
to avoid and uncover malicious actions.
4 Attack strategies
There are many strategies that insiders can use to reach their goals. In this sec-
tion, first of all, we consider the issue of how to structure these attack strategies.
We do so with two goals. First, we want to abstract the big picture of insider
attack to have a better understanding of the problem as a whole. Second, we
want to acknowledge which attack alternatives can be exploited by insiders to
have a better understanding of the problem in details. To meet these goals we
review the structures we use in our framework: attack patterns and decompo-
sition trees. Then, we describe how we applied these structures to the insider
problem.
2 Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability
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Attack patterns [22] extend the idea of attack trees (introduced by Schneier [7]).
Attack trees permit the modeling of security threats represented as the root of
the tree. This threat is successively refined to a level of detail chosen by the
designer of the tree. Nodes are connected by AND and OR joints, indicating
conjunction and disjunction between pairs of nodes for the achievement of their
parent node. Attack scenarios, i.e. sub-steps of an attack, are obtained by travers-
ing the attack tree in a depth-first fashion. Attack patterns are generic and ab-
stract from several attack trees. They do not only describe steps to achieve the
root goal but also pre- and postconditions.
Decomposition trees permit the breakdown of a tree root and sub-nodes, in
terms of AND/OR relations. This kind of tree provides a structured way for the
analysis of alternatives and has been used for goal-oriented analysis of require-
ments [23]. Towards its root, the tree allows for the abstraction of alternatives
and, towards its leaves, the tree allows for precision of alternatives.
We structure attack strategies exploited by insiders in four strategy decom-
position trees using two sources: literature [11,4,5,12,24] and the taxonomy of
control principles presented in the previous section. The trees are ”Pre-attack”,
”Gain access”, ”Abuse access” and ”Abuse permission” and can be found in
Appendix A. The main idea of these trees is to provide a wide spectrum of
strategies used by insiders to launch attacks instead of providing a step-by-step
analysis of a specific attack from an attacker’s3 goal.
An attack is defined as [25] ”a series of steps taken by an attacker to achieve
an unauthorized result”. Thus, each attack step can also be composed of sub-
steps. As an example, we consider two insiders: the first insider wants to cause
major losses to the organization by deleting files from its servers, the second
insider wants to collapse the organization’s share prices in the market for per-
sonal financial benefit by denying services to its network. Although the insiders
have different goals, a common way to accomplish these goals would be via de-
ployment of logic bombs4. There are many alternatives for an insider to deploy
a logic bomb such as: (ex.1) ”use own legitimate account, create backdoor ac-
count”, and then ”use backdoor account, deploy logic bombs”, or (ex.2) ”use
accounts not disabled on job termination, deploy logic bombs”. Each of those
sub-steps is represented in one of the attack strategy trees. The aim of these
trees is to abstract from insiders’ goals and concentrate on alternatives they can
use, without going into details on how each alternative can be accomplished. In
ex.1, the following two steps have been used: (step 1) ”Gain access tree - node
1, Abuse access tree - node 2” and (step 2) ”Gain access tree - node 15, Abuse
access tree - node 21”. In ex. 2, the following step has been used: (step 1) ”Gain
access tree - node 13, Abuse access tree - node 21”.
We capture the ”insider attack” in an attack pattern shown, in a textual
manner, in Figure 2. This pattern models a step toward an insider attack. It
means that using the pattern twice, steps 1 and 2 from ex.1 are represented
3 In our context, the terms attacker and insider are used interchangeably.
4 FromWikipedia ”A logic bomb is a piece of code intentionally inserted into a software
system that will set off a malicious function when specified conditions are met”
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and using the pattern once, step 1 from ex. 2 is also represented. Our insider
attack pattern models the attack scenarios listed next. These scenarios help us
to organize our perception of the insider threat as a whole and, at the same
time, provide a choice of possible templates for their instantiation using the four
attack strategy trees, as we demonstrated in ex.1 and ex.2.
<Pre-attack, Gain access, Abuse access, Abuse permission>
<Pre-attack, Gain access, Abuse access>
<Pre-attack, Gain access, Abuse permission>
<Gain access, Abuse access, Abuse permission>
<Gain access, Abuse access>
<Gain access, Abuse permission>
Insider Attack Pattern:
Goal: Exploit abuse of access and/or permission to perform fraud, theft of information and IT sabotage in         
the internal perimeter of an organization
Precondition: Attacker has knowledge acquired while working for the organization
Attack:
OR  1. Pre-attack strategy step
AND / OR
1.1. Abuse access strategy step
1.2. Abuse permission strategy step
2. Gain access strategy step
AND / OR
1.1. Abuse access strategy step
1.2. Abuse permission strategy step
Postcondition: Attacker performs a malicious action in the internal perimeter of the organization
Fig. 2. Insiders attack pattern
In this section, we modeled insider threats and delivered an insider attack
pattern and four attack strategy trees. The former provides, for example, aware-
ness that access is the essential component of any insider attack, since all attack
scenarios derived from the pattern include ”Gain access”. The latter provides,
for example, awareness that insider access can be acquired for grant, can be
created or discovered. In the next section we deal with defense strategies against
these attack strategies.
5 Defense strategies
We present, in this section, a list of defense strategies derived from (i) the analysis
of attack strategies which can be exploited by insiders, as discussed in Section 4,
(ii) the taxonomy of control principles provided in Section 3, and (iii) literature
review [11,4,5,12,24]. The defense strategies are organized in three lists, the first
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corresponds to the attack strategy trees ”Pre-attack” and ”Gain access”, the
second corresponds to the tree ”Abuse access” and the third corresponds to
the tree ”Abuse permission”. These defense strategies have been composed with
the same objective of broadness instead of deepness as we did for the attack
strategies. They will be useful as a reference when eliciting requirements for the
defense against insider risks, in step 5 6.5 of the framework method.
Defense strategies against ”Pre-attack” and ”Gain access” attack strategies:
1. review all access paths to assets periodically to ensure actual paths match
expected paths
2. ensure that only access paths needed for an individual’s job function are
activated
3. ensure the deactivation of all paths available for an individual upon job
termination
4. enforce tight password management: (i) adopt strong password, (ii) change
passwords periodically, and (iii) check periodically all information systems
administration passwords to identify out-of-box unchanged passwords
5. enforce strong authentication
6. ensure security patches are applied in a regular basis on every node of the
inner network area
7. support security policies by education, i.e. organization-wide security aware-
ness and training initiatives for potential insiders
8. watch for behavioral precursors like disruption, dissatisfaction, level of ex-
pectations
Defense strategies against ”Abuse access” attack strategies:
1. adopt inventory and configuration management to audit whether hardware
and software installed in desktops and servers comply with what is expected
2. use periodical data integrity checks on critical information
3. enforce physical measures for access to information
4. inspect code (e.g. via peer review) with the specific purpose of identifying
trap doors (from CWE5 ”a feature intentionally placed in a program that
facilitates remote debugging or system maintenance which can compromise
the security of an application”), buffer overflows (from CWE ”this condi-
tion exists when a program attempts to put more data in a buffer than it
can hold”; it permits unauthorized access to memory area adjacent to the
allocated buffer), logic/time bombs, validation errors, error handling failure,
etc, left by developers intentionally or not
5. ensure audit data cannot be modified by anyone in the organization
6. analyze audit logs to track critical transactions and to track access, modifi-
cation and deletion of critical information
Defense strategies against ”Abuse permission” attack strategies:
5 Common Weakness Enumeration: www.cwe.mitre.org, sponsored by the U.S. De-
partment of Homeland Security
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1. review objects classification periodically
2. check periodically expected users permissions, based on job function, and ac-
tual permissions, based on actions performed. However, individuals usually
perform several roles within his/her job function. Thus, the set of expected
permissions for an individual is the sum of all permissions acquired through
(i) direct role assignment, (ii) indirect role assignment, i.e. role hierarchy,
(iii) delegation, i.e. temporary permissions, and (iv) role management defi-
ciencies, for example, an employee has been promoted to another function
and his/her previous roles have not been disabled. Two controls are impor-
tant. First, if the set of all actual permissions an individual has exceeds the
expected permissions the organization defined for the job function. Second,
if the set of permissions violates separation of duties, in this case a detailed
analysis of critical assets and processes dealt by this individual is necessary
3. check if delegated permissions conflict with permissions an individual had at
the time of delegation; in this case, static separation of duties are violated
4. check delegations followed by revocations; this scenario can be exploited to
overcome object separation of duties [19]. A same object can be accessed
by two exclusive roles, assuming delegation causes a temporary loss of the
delegated permissions, which is then reacquired by revocation. Because this
violation is dynamic, it can only be detected by the analysis of audit logs
5. review periodically execution of tasks which require two peers for completion
6. ensure that critical data, such as passwords to critical assets, are not exclu-
sively handled by an uniquely privileged individual
7. review separation of duties at the functional level; a matrix with job functions
both on columns and lines and a cross on conflicting intersections can help
identifying SoD among job functions
8. review separation of duties at the process level through auditing. However,
it is pre-requisite to have strong role management because, otherwise, even
if the separation of operations is checked, it can happen that two critical
operations are logged as being performed by different roles but, in practice,
the same individual executed both. Critical operations can also span several
applications and in this case a cross-application audit is necessary, and a
manual mapping between roles from these applications is a pre-requisite for
detecting violations of SoD
9. ensure non-repudiation of privileged actions: (i) set formal mechanisms for
requesting services to administrators and establish a link between requests
and actions performed by administrators can be checked via auditing; (ii) a
profile of actions expected to be performed to resolve most common types
of requests for administrators can be created to allow matching between
expected and actual actions
Now, we match control principles, attack strategies, and defense strategies
in a matrix, as shown in Table 1. The horizontal axis contains a concise list of
defense strategies, derived from the lists described above. They have been com-
posed with the same objective of broadness instead of deepness as we did for the
attack strategies. They will be useful as a reference when deriving requirements
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Table 1. Attack and defense strategies with control principles at intersections
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for the defense against insider risks, in step 5 (Section 6.5) of the framework
method. The vertical axis contains the first level of nodes from the attack de-
composition trees (where PA refers ”Pre-attack”, GA to ”Gain access”, AA to
”Abuse access” and AP to ”Abuse permission”). The intersections between de-
fense and attack strategies provide insights on which control principles can be
used to mitigate the threat of the attack strategy and strength the protection of
the defense strategy.
This matrix is an example and needs to be customized by organizations
according to the controls they use. Furthermore, it can be refined to a more
concrete level by replacing a control by tools, policies and procedures that im-
plement that control. If kept up-to-date, this matrix can provide insights about
weaknesses in controls applied to some defenses against attack strategies.
So far, we reviewed control principles (Section 3) which are relevant either
from the perspective of attack strategies, discussed in Section 4, and from the
perspective of defense strategies, discussed in Section 5. We also explicitely con-
nected these three elements in a matrix and presented deliverables corresponding
to attack and defense strategies. The next section describes a method for the
assessment of risks represented by insiders against the organization critical as-
sets/processes. This assessment provides means for the organization to gather
requirements for defense, in terms of prevention and detection of insiders.
6 Method steps: gathering requirements for defense
against insider
The concepts presented in the previous sections are used in our method for
requirements gathering that is presented in this section. The method, shown in
IDEF0 notation in Figure 3, consists of 5 steps. The boxes represent functions,
i.e. steps of the method. Horizontal arrows coming into the boxes are inputs
which are transformed by the functions into outputs, which are represented by
arrows coming out of the boxes. Vertical arrows represent inputs which are not
transformed by the functions into outputs.
The next sub-sections 6.1 to 6.5 provide an overview of each step of the
method. The main idea underlying the method is to keep alignment between
organizational goal(s)/business mission, the input of the method as a whole, and
defense against insider threats as captured by requirements. These requirements
are the output of the method as a whole.
6.1 Step 1: Identify critical assets and processes
The main goal of the first step is to narrow the scope of the investigation about
insider threat to the core business of the organization by identifying critical
assets and processes. Critical assets may include data, information systems and
services as well as processes concentrated on one application or spanning several
applications.
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Step 1
Identify critical assets 
and processes
Step 2
Select one critical asset 
or process
Step 3
Identify risks related to 
insider threat
Step 4
Assess risks related to 
insider threat
Step 5
Elicit goal-based 
requirements for defense 
against insider threat
Organization 
mission/
business
goal Set of 
assets/
processes
List of critical 
assets/processes
One critical 
asset/process
selected
List of risks 
identified for the 
asset/process
Prioritized list
of risks for the
asset/process
Organization
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strategies
Defense
strategies
Insider 
Attack 
pattern
Assets/processes
security level
Asset/process
defense
specification 
List of defense 
requirements for 
the asset/process
Fig. 3. Method for gathering requirements for defense against insiders
12
Two elements are input for this step: (i) the organization goal(s)/business
mission, and (ii) the set of all assets and processes of the organization. We do
not prescribe any method for determining the criticality of assets. Nevertheless,
Critical Impact Factors , proposed on previous work from one of the authors [26],
is a promising way to determine critical assets while keeping a straight alignment
with the organization goal(s)/business mission. The list of critical assets and
processes should be a consensus among stakeholders.
Output: list of critical assets/processes
6.2 Step 2: Select one critical asset/process
From the previous step we acquire knowledge about the organization main tar-
gets of control. The goal of the second step is to narrow the scope of the insider
threat investigation even further by prioritizing the critical assets/processes. The
advantage of doing this is two-fold. The first advantage follows the known Di-
vide and Conquer strategy. It helps providing a short-term estimation for the
number of identification/assessment sessions and a longer-term estimation for
the number of iterations necessary to cover the whole set of critical assets/pro-
cesses. The second advantage is the re-use of defense requirements among critical
assets/processes.
No specific method for prioritization, allowing selection of one critical as-
set/process, is prescribed. It remains up to the organization to decide which
criteria to use for the selection.
Output: one critical asset/process selected
6.3 Step 3: Identify risks related to insider threat
The previous step provides an unique focus for the remaining three steps. The
objective of step 3 is to identify risks which turn the critical asset/process vul-
nerable to insiders. We divide this step in two stages. In the first stage, a rep-
resentative of security is nominated the champion. This person will use system
architecture diagrams, the Insider Attack Pattern (in Section 4) and the attack
strategy trees (in Appendix A) to list risks he believes are relevant for the critical
asset/process. In the second stage, stakeholders will get together to discuss risks
represented by insiders and it will be more effective if they have spent some time
to build a short list of the top risks in their view, using the attack strategy trees
as reference. The session(s), conducted by the champion, aims to get agreement
about the risks.
It is worth mentioning that the attack strategy trees can be used either to
identify one step which represents a risk on its own or to identify an insider
scenario according to the Insider Attack Pattern instantiated with the attack
strategy trees. As an example of the former case, stakeholders can think about
”accumulate privileges” (Abuse permission tree - node 14) as a risk to a loan
process. As an example of the latter case, stakeholders can think about the attack
steps ”use legitimate access (developer), insert trap door in application” (Gain
access tree - node 1, Abuse access tree - node 19) and then ”exploit vulnerability
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on application , modify/delete critical data” (Gain access tree - node 4, Abuse
access tree - node 13) as a risk to a human resource database.
Output: list of risks identified for the asset/process
6.4 Step 4: Assess risks related to insider threat
This step aims to prioritize the risks for a particular asset/process that have
been identified in the previous step. One input for this assessment phase is the
critical asset/process defense specification, i.e. defense mechanisms and methods
already implemented. The defense specification allows for the determination of
a defense level for the asset/process in respect to the risk under consideration.
This defense level may either be considered ”high” or ”low” and consequently
the risk level is derived as the opposite. Determining the defense level can be
straightforward. For example, if the human resource database uses strong au-
thentication methods and the risk being analyzed is ”get password” then the
defense level will probably be considered as ”high”, and consequently the risk
as ”low”. As another example, for the ”accumulate privileges” risk, determining
the defense level would involve auditing a structure of role assignments, which
might be complicated at this point. In this case, considering the defense level as
”low” would be the most appropriate decision because the risk would then be
forwarded to the next step as ”high” priority. We acknowledge that this defense
classification is a weak point of the method because it relies completely on the
subjective judgment of the champion, or any security specialist, and agreement
among stakeholders. Tool support for the evaluation of defense levels would be
an advantage. Nevertheless, we also believe this weakness does not invalidate the
method since the determination of the defense level follows a clear rationale.
The process of risk assessment described should be followed for each risk
identified for the asset/process. It remains open to organizations to set limits in
terms of the number of risks analyzed, carried over or postponed to a new round
of the method.
Output: prioritized list of risks for the asset/process
6.5 Step 5: Elicit defense goals against insider threat for the
asset/process
From the previous step the organization acquires awareness about which insider
risks are top priority for the asset/process. In this step the focus is to look
at which defense strategies can be used to bring the asset/process to a level
of defense which avoids/uncovers those risks. The defense strategies listed in
Section 5 are elaborated in the format of defense goals, which match Anton’s [27]
definition of goals: ”goals are high level objectives of the business, organization,
or system. They capture the reasons why a system is needed and guide decisions
at various levels within the enterprise”. Thus, we aim in this step to identify,
for each risk within the asset/process risk list, a list of defense goals, using as
reference the defense strategies provided.
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After applying the method to all critical assets/processes, overlapping de-
fense goals among several assets/processes should be identified and the priority
of defense goals should be determined. Therefore, the complete list of defense
goals needs to be analyzed, refined and decomposed into requirements for imple-
mentation in the organization. Several researchers have proposed methods and
tools for the goal-based requirements (e.g. [27,28,29]) but it is out of the scope
of this method.
Output: list of defense requirements for the asset/process
7 The framework applied: an example
Figure 4 shows an example scenario, collected from Chinchani et al. [30], for
a fictitious financial institution. We first provide an overview of the example
scenario and then apply our framework to the scenario in Section 7.1.
Basically, a teller can complete any personal account transaction involving
$5,000 or less, accessing the personal account database, but only a manager can
complete transactions, initiated by a teller, above this limit. Only managers can
perform transactions on business accounts. Communication between computers
and databases is encrypted. A manager needs to provide his credentials to a PKI
server to be authenticated. Upon successful authentication, he receives a session
key to access the business account database. Both databases are protected by
firewalls to prevent external attacks. We assume the personal account transac-
tions are performed via application A and the business account transactions are
performed via application B.
Personal
account
database
Business
account
database
PKI
server
Manager’s
computer
Teller’s
computer firewall
firewall
credentials
session key
session key
communication channel
information flow
Fig. 4. Example scenario from a fictitious financial institution(adapted
from [30])
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7.1 Example - step 1
A standard business mission for financial institutions is usually in the line of
”provide high quality banking services/financial solutions”. Thus, it implies on
the high criticality of assets and processes related to monetary transactions for
customers. In step 1, management identifies the critical assets/processes. In this
very simple example, we assume that this results in the following list:
– asset: personal account database
– process: endorsement of personal account transactions over $5,000
– asset: business account database
– process: business account transactions
7.2 Example - step 2
We select the process ”business account transactions” because, although this
process seems already well protected, the board of directors want to re-assure
whether there is any risk left.
7.3 Example - step 3 and 4
We simulate the role of champion and stakeholders to identify risks using as
reference the Insider Attack Pattern and the four attack strategy trees. They
look at each branch of the trees and decide if the risk reported is relevant for the
process and if it suggests another situation (i.e. sequence of steps) also relevant.
The table 2 shows the risks identified and assessed.
The risks marked in bold are the ones considered high priority to be carried
over to step 5.
7.4 Example - step 5
In this step we only identify the defense strategies which seem appropriate as
countermeasures for the five risks selected in the previous step. In a real situation,
the defense strategies need to be adapted and refined. Table 3 contains the output
of the method, i.e. goal-based requirements for defense against the organizations’
insiders.
The example demonstrates the potential applicability of the framework for
the identification of insider risks and corresponding defenses. We have seen that
the process analyzed, which seemed already well protected, is in fact subject to
risks which might not be evident.
8 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the proposed framework around three topics which,
we believe, turn it interesting: (i) merging of access-oriented and permission-
oriented approaches for the insider problem, (ii) abstraction from attacker goals
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Risk Defense
level
Risk
level
R1 terminated manager uses his account and credentials
soon after his termination to perform fraudulent business
transactions
high low
R2 terminated manager uses a backdoor account and his
”old” credentials to perform business transactions
low high
R3 insider gains physical access to a manager’s authenticated
computer and performs business transactions
high low
R4 insider (e.g. a teller) learns a vulnerability specific to the
organization, i.e. that the manager does not apply secu-
rity patches on a regular basis and exploit a known vul-
nerability to get the manager’s credentials, then obtain
a session key from the PKI sever and perform business
transactions
low high
R5 manager deploys a logic/time bomb in the business ac-
count database
low high
R6 manager performs fraudulent business transactions ap-
plied to, for example, wife or boyfriend accounts (as ben-
eficiaries)
high low
R7 insider discloses information about business transactions
to competitors or press
low high
R8 insider, member of application B developers team, insert
a trap door in the application (e.g. if sessionKey = 999
then authenticated = true), and perform business trans-
actions
low high
R9 manager shares his password and credentials with a teller
or another manager (e.g. in case of an emergency), and
they perform business transaction in the ”name” of the
original manager
high low
Table 2. Example: risks for the critical process ”business account transactions”
identified and assessed
and focus on attacker means, organized in four blocks, i.e. ”Pre-attack”, ”Gain
access”, ”Abuse access” and ”Abuse permission”, and (iii) the shift from risk-
based to defense-based assessment of insider threat risks.
The problem of insider threat needs to be analyzed not only from the ”abuse
access” perspective but also from the ”abuse permission” perspective to be able
to address the three categories of insiders intention, i.e. IT sabotage, fraud and
theft of information. While the first is more related to ”abuse access”, the other
two are more related to ”abuse permission”. The permission concern has been
extensively tackled within the research community related to the formalization
and automatic enforcement of policies, surveyed by Damianou et al. [31]. In
this line of research, the overall aim is to constraint potential insiders within
the boundaries of access control. However, the management of access control
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Defense goal
D1 review all access paths to assets periodically to ensure actual paths
match expected paths
D2 ensure security patches are applied in a regular basis on every node of
the inner network area
D3 adopt inventory and configuration management to audit if hardware
and software installed in desktops and servers comply with expected
D4 analyze audit logs to track critical transactions and to track access,
modification and deletion of critical information
D5 inspect code (e.g. via peer review)
D6 support security policies by education, i.e. organization-wide security
awareness and training initiatives for potential insiders
Table 3. Example: defense goals for the critical process ”business account trans-
actions” elicited
may deteriorate over time, opening security breaches for abuse. So, we aim to
gather requirements for defending an organization against insiders by detecting
permission abuse as well as access abuse.
Our approach to the modeling of insider threat concentrates on the spec-
trum of alternatives an insider can exploit to reach individual intentions, secret
goals. This approach enables the representation of insiders activities categorized
in four blocks, i.e. ”Pre-attack”, ”Gain access”, ”Abuse access” and ”Abuse per-
mission”, while still capturing a broad range of abuses, either from the access
domain and from the permission domain. Other researchers have split the in-
sider problem into different main blocks. For example, in the Insider Threat 2004
Workshop [12], the Attacker Models group divided the possible actions an in-
sider can take in four categories: obtaining access, reconnaissance, entrenchment
and exploitation, and extraction and exfiltration. Butts et al. [32] categorize
the type of actions an insider can perform in: alteration, distribution, snooping
and elevation. We believe our division is particular in the sense that it derives
from control principles and therefore also deals with exploitations related to
more sophisticated access control breaches such as the ones related to roles and
separation of duties, not present on these other works.
We prioritize risks represented by insiders using the level of defense of the
asset/process under analysis for a specific risk. The most used approach to pri-
oritize risks related to attacks rely on measures of attack likelihood or impact
(e.g. [33,10]). However, it is difficult to determine probability measures for the
likelihood of an insider attack in a meaningful way. Furthermore, it is also diffi-
cult to evaluate the impact of an insider attack since it depends on the insider
intents/goals. Chinchani et al. [30] quantify attacks by assigning a cost based
on the resistance of an asset, provided by access control mechanisms and deter-
mined by security experts. This last approach is similar to ours in the sense that
it shifts the focus of risk assessment from the attack itself, like it happens when
measuring likelihood and impact, to the defense. This shift allows the classifi-
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cation of a same risk differently according to the level of defense or degree of
resistance of the asset/process under this risk.
In this section, we presented some strong points of the proposed framework.
However the framework has still another strong point. It is simple enough to be
useful in organizations of any size.
9 Related work
The framework presented in this paper is related to insider threat modeling and
risk management, the main ingredients of our approach. With respect to the
latter, we review two risk management frameworks, OCTAVE [33] and NIST SP
800-30 [10], considered of relevance for our work. With respect to the former, we
already reviewed along the paper relevant related work [7,8,9,12,32].
The OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Eval-
uation) is a risk evaluation methodology also based on a triplex similar to those
used in our framework: critical assets, threats to those assets and vulnerabili-
ties that expose the assets to threats. It is composed of three phases, each one
composed of several processes. The first phase uses enterprise knowledge from
many hierarchical levels to identify assets, threats, risk indicators and security
requirements. OCTAVE uses the concept of threat profile for an asset based
on five properties: asset, actor, motive/access (optional), and outcome (disclo-
sure, modification, destruction, loss, interruption). The second phase deals with
the identification of infrastructure vulnerabilities. Assets are prioritized based
on threats identified on previous phase and vulnerabilities are evaluated based
standard catalogs such as known intrusion scenarios. The third phase prioritizes
risks based on impact and probability derived from risk indicators gathered from
staff and develop a plan to manage the risks. Three points from OCTAVE are
of interest for our work: (i) threats are gathered from enterprise knowledge. Al-
though it is a powerful approach similar to a broad brainstorm it can also be
time consuming and inefficient; (ii) assets are prioritized based on threats. We
believe our approach which considers critical assets determined by organization
goal(s)/business mission more to be appropriate. For example, an asset can be
highly critical business wise and therefore very well protected, thus being sub-
ject to low threat; (iii) vulnerabilities are identified based on catalogs of known
intrusion scenarios. Vulnerabilities in our framework are implicitly evaluated in
terms of the asset/process defense level specific for the threat under analysis. So,
when assessing the threat ”accumulation of privileges” this is the focus of the
evaluation of defense level, and is hardly found on catalogs. So, in this sense we
believe our framework allows a broader assessment of risk for the insider problem
and consequently a broader view on requirements for defense.
NIST SP 800-30 is a standard which provides guidance for risk manage-
ment through a system’s life cycle. It comprehends three processes, i.e. risk as-
sessment, risk mitigation, and evaluation/assessment. We concentrate on some
aspects of the first process, composed of nine steps, which overlaps with our
framework. Threat identification is based on threat-source analysis, i.e. natural
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threats, human threats (e.g. terminated employees, unauthorized users), and en-
vironmental threats. Vulnerability identification is performed independently of
threat identification, from the perspective of system flaws or weaknesses which
can be exploited by threat-sources. Then, a matching between vulnerability and
threat is performed. Control analysis identifies the implemented, or planned to
be implemented, controls to minimize the likelihood of a threat. The framework
provides a list of preventive controls, which can be technical (e.g. access control
enforcement, authentication, encryption) or non-technical, i.e. management and
operational controls, and detective controls (e.g. Intrusion Detection Systems,
audit trails, checksums). Likelihood is determined in terms of high/medium/low,
based on threat-source, vulnerability and existence/effectiveness of controls. Im-
pact is also determined in terms of high/medium/low, based on system mission,
system/data criticality and system/data sensitivity. Two points from this NIST
standard are worth emphasizing in respect to our work: (i) threats are derived
from threat-sources. Thus, in terms of insiders, the focus would be on human
threats. We believe our approach of attack strategies induces a broader vision
of the insider problem, since it provides insights not commonly explored, as
for example, separation of duty scenarios, which are unlikely to be considered
in threat-source reasoning; (ii) vulnerabilities and controls have to be analyzed.
We have a more focused approach when we evaluate defense level for one specific
threat, indirectly combining the two.
10 Conclusion
Recent surveys have shown that the insider threat problem is getting equally
important to the outsider threat problem. However, the latter has received more
attention from the research community. We address the former by proposing
a framework composed of a method for gathering goal-based requirements for
defense against insiders. The method is supported by attack strategies structured
in four decomposition trees, an Insider Attack Pattern and defense strategies.
The framework aims to help organizations to get awareness about the insider
problem in their environment and about defenses for addressing the problem, in
a systematic way.
As short-term future work we plan to apply our framework in practice as an
action research study in a large Dutch organization. It will enable us to validate
and calibrate the framework. Additionally, it will also provide insights about
our long-term future work towards developing tools to address the insider threat
problem. As an example, we think of a tool for the evaluation of the defense
level of an asset, to make the process of risk assessment of our framework less
dependent on expert judgment.
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Appendix A - Tree structures of attack strategies
Pre-attack
social 
engineering
get physical 
possession of 
backups
convince the 
sharing of 
passwords
shoulder 
surfing
use brute-force 
methods
use pw 
guessing 
strategies
use pw 
cracking 
software
use pw sniffing 
methods
exploit weak 
hash alg. for 
encrypted pw
use default 
passwords
guess obvious 
passwords
use keyboard 
stroke hw/ sw
get password
search for pw 
(e.g. e-mails, 
post-it, etc)
steal passwordsocial 
engineering
abuse of 
authority to get 
password
build up 
relationship to 
get info
Infiltrate to the 
organization
replace 
password
use unclosed 
browser for pw 
protected url(s)
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Fig. 5. Tree structure of attack strategies involved with ”Pre-attack”
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Fig. 6. Tree structure for attack strategies involved with ”Gain access”
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Fig. 7. Tree structure for attack strategies involved with ”Abuse access”
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Fig. 8. Tree structure for attack strategies involved with ”Abuse permission”
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